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The Undiscovered Country:
Execution Competency & Comprehending Death
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier'
The day, the night, brought him alternations of hope and fear;
and so things went until the evening when he felt, or understood,
that the inevitable death would come three days later, at sunrise.
He had never thought of death; for him it had no shape. But now
he felt plainly that it had entered his cell, and was groping about in
search of him. To escape it he began to run.
LEONID ANDREYEV
INTRODUCTION
A large percentage of condemned inmates, as well as other prison and
jail inmates, have mental disabilities.3 In the case of people on death row,
those disabilities may be aggravated by the contemplation of an impending
death,4 and, in such situations, issues about competency to be executed may
arise.5 Despite a ban on executing insane inmates that has a pedigree that
I Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. J.D., Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, 1989; B.A., Case Western Reserve University, 1984. The
author thanks Eliyahu Federman and Virginia Wilbur for their research assistance.
2 LEONID ANDREYEVTHE SEVEN THAT WERE HANGED 24 (9i8).
3 See, e.g., ELIZABETH KANDEL ENGLANDER, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE 95 (1997) (stat-
ing that "very violent and recidivistic individuals frequently have a multitude of handicaps,
including neurological and medical disorders, profound psychological disorders, and intel-
lectual and familial dysfunction"); Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and
PsychoeducationalCharacteristics ofi5 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
838, 841-42 (1986) (finding that a large number of condemned individuals likely have unrec-
ognized severe psychiatric, neurological, and cognitive disorders); DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E.
GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 165 (2oo6) (concluding that 56% of state prisoners, 45% of federal
prisoners, and 64% of local jail inmates have mental health problems).
4 "In the history of murder, the onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death
sentence is not a rare phenomenon." Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting), abrogated by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986); see also Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Our Existential Death Penalty: Judges, Jurors, and Terror Management, 32 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 93-96 (Zoo8) (discussing the psychological effects of impending death on
death row inmates).
5 The terms "insanity/sanity" and "incompetence/competence" have both been used
through history regarding the execution standard, so both terms appear throughout this
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goes back centuries, courts today are still struggling with the reasons for the
ban and with how to define when one is incompetent to be executed.
The two United States Supreme Court decisions addressing the standard
for execution competency have not defined a clear standard. In Ford v.
Wainwright,6 decided in 1986, a divided Court left lower courts to speculate
on the meaning of the various opinions in the case. In the 2007 decision of
Panettiv. Quarterman,7 the Court added further insight into the competency
standard but left many unanswered questions.8 In a dissenting opinion by
Justice Thomas that was joined by three other members of the Court, he
argued that what emerged from the majority opinion was "a half-baked
holding that leaves the details of the insanity standard for the [d]istrict
[clourt to work out."9
One issue regarding the standard left open by the Court is the question
of to what extent a mentally-ill capital defendant must understand the
concept of death, i.e., to be competent must a defendant understand that
execution means the end of her or his physical life? Lower courts are
beginning to struggle with this issue, as a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit did prior to the Panetti decision in Walton v. Johnson.1"
The ban on executing the insane has been passed down through
English common law so that the Supreme Court basically accepted it as
a given. The Court has not settled on a clear policy for the ban, but the
Justices have considered the historical rationales, such as the argument that
it is inhumane to execute the insane when they cannot prepare to meet
Article. The American Bar Association (ABA) and others often use the "competency" termi-
nology rather than the "sanity" terminology because of confusion that might arise between
insanity in the execution context and insanity as a criminal defense. See Kimberly S. Ackerson,
Stanley L. Brodsky & Patricia A. Zapf, Judges' and Psychologists' Assessments of Legal and Clinical
Factors in Competence for Execution, II PSYCHOL. PUB. POI'y & L. 164, 169 (2005).
6 Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
7 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
8 See, e.g., Lauren E. Perry, Hiding Behind Precedent: Why Panetti v. Quarterman Will Create
Confusionfor Incompetent Death Row Inmates, 86 N.C. L. REV. io68, 1078 (2008) (noting that the
Court's failure to define "rational understanding" in Panetti "leaves the lower courts in the
awkward position of having to define an abstract concept").
9 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 978 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Chris Koepke, Note, Panetti
v. Quarterman: Exploring the Unsettled and Unsettling, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1383, 1404 (2oo8) (not-
ing that "Panetti leaves a tremendous number of issues for lower courts to resolve"); Robert
A. Stark, Note, There May or May Not Be Blood: Why the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against
Executing the Insane Requires a Definitive Standard, 41 CREIGHTON L. REv. 763, 786-89 (2oo8)
(arguing that the Panetti Court's failure to articulate a clear standard leads to arbitrary applica-
tion of the death penalty).
1o Walton v. Johnson, 44o F3d I6o (4th Cit. 2006). In a dissenting opinion, Fourth Circuit
Chief Judge Wilkins argued that "an individual's understanding of the fact of execution must
include at least a rudimentary comprehension that execution will mean his death, defined as
the end of his physical life." Id. at 183 (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting).
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their Maker." Which policy one embraces for the execution ban, however,
may affect the standard for determining competency. Considering the
policy goals behind the ban, there should be a requirement that a mentally
ill defendant can contemplate death. But even discussing the standard
reveals some absurdities about the death penalty and about the execution
competency requirement.
This Article addresses the issue of to what extent the Eighth Amendment
competency standard should require mentally ill defendants to know about
the significance of their deaths. More specifically, this Article answers the
question of whether a defendant who does not fully appreciate the concept
of death can be found to be competent to be executed. Part I discusses
the history and the policy behind the ban on the execution of the insane.
Part II discusses the key Supreme Court decisions regarding the standard
for determining competency to be executed. Part III considers statutory
definitions of competency and examines how lower courts have dealt with
mentally ill defendants who argue they do not understand that they are
going to their deaths. In Part IV, the Article proposes a standard that is
consistent with the historical underpinnings of the ban on executing the
insane and that is consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
I. HISTORY & POLICY BEHIND THE BAN ON THE EXECUTION OF THE INSANE
The ban on executing the insane has a heritage spanning centuries,
and the historical background provides the foundation for recent Supreme
Court decisions addressing the ban. Therefore, anyone seeking the correct
standard to determine execution competency must begin with the history
behind the ban and the historical justifications used for prohibiting the
execution of the insane.
A. History Behind the Ban on the Execution of the Insane
The Anglo-American common-law ban on executing the insane dates
back centuries to the medieval period." Commentators find the origins
I I See Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (citing Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr Charles Bateman, I I
How. ST. T. 474,477 (1685)).
12 KENT S. MILLER & MICHAEL L. RADELET, EXECUTING THE MENTALLY ILL: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE CASE OF ALVIN FORD I (1993) (citing Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S.
9 (I95O)); I NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 2 (1968); Note, Insaniy of the
Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533, 535 (1979); Paul J. Larkin, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the
Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 778 (I98O)). In England, "[t]he
record of the late Middle Ages reveals a reasonable measure of compassion and skepticism....
[A]lthough in homicide cases resulting in acquittal insanity might not have been accepted as a
defense, offenders thought to be mentally deranged generally enjoyed pardons and custodial
care." DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMOURS: TIHE INSANITY DEFENSE FROM
ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 72-73 (1996).
2009-20101
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of the ban somewhere between the eleventh century 3 and the thirteenth
century.4 As Justice Frankfurter explained, "[tihis limitation on the power
of the State to take life has been part of our law for centuries, recognized
during periods of English history when feelings were more barbarous and
men recoiled less from brutal action than we like to think is true of our
time."'" Interestingly, around the same time as this humane ban developed,
England switched execution methods, substituting hanging for "mutilation
as the standard punishment for all serious crimes."' 16
After the ban developed, it continued to be applied in England. In
the 1600's, Sir Edward Coke interpreted the common law of England as
banning the execution of the insane, 7 and in the eighteenth centuryWilliam
Blackstone wrote about the ban.'" By the middle of the eighteenth century,
the ban was "a matter of rote and respectful recitation" in England. 9
In the United States, cases and commentary from the nineteenth century
and later endorsed the common-law ban on executing the incompetent."0
In 1950, Justice Frankfurter noted that no state allowed the execution of
13 See Bruce Ebert, Competency to Be Executed: A Proposed Instrument to Evaluate an Inmate's
Level of Competency in Light of the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against the Execution of the Presently
Insane, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 32 (2ooI). "[lit has been a cardinal principle of Anglo-
American jurisprudence since the medieval period that the presently incompetent should not
be executed." Larkin, supra note i, at 778.
14 See Roberta M. Harding, "Endgame": Competency andthe Execution of Condemned Inmates
- A Proposalto Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against the Infliction of Crueland Unusual
Punishment, I4 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 105, 109 (1994) (stating, "[iun approximately the 13th
century, the unlawfulness of executing the 'insane' or 'mad' was established").
15 Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 16-17 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), abrogated by Ford, 477 U.S. at
405.
16 JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND BRITISH POLITICS: THE BRITISH
MOVEMENT TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY 1945-57 13 (1962). This switch occurred during
the thirteenth century. Id.
17 See SIR EDWARD COKE, THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (6th
ed., London, W. Rawlins I68o).
18 See 4WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25.
19 Bryan Lester Dupler, The Uncommon Law: Insanity, Executions, and Oklahoma Criminal
Procedure, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002). During King Henry VIII's reign, however, the king
attempted to lift the ban on executing the insane for cases of high treason. See id. at 12 (citing
EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (photo. reprint
1985) (London, W. Clarke 1817) (I644)). King Henry VIII's law allowing such executions did
not last long and was repealed because it was against the common law. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408
n.I.
20 See Larkin, supra note 12, at 779; see, e.g., State v. Vann, 84 N.C. 722 (I88I); 1 JOSEPH
CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 525 (Philadelphia, Isaac Riley I819); 1
FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 89 (8th ed., Philadelphia, Kay and Brother
I88o); see also People v. Scott, 157 N.E. 247, 258 (I1. 1927); Howie v. State, 83 So. I58, 159-6o
(Miss. I919); In re Smith, 176 P. 819, 822 (N.M. 1918).
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the insane."' By the time the Supreme Court decided Fordv. Wainwright2z
in 1986, the Court could reflect that "[flor centuries no jurisdiction has
countenanced the execution of the insane."23 Today, in the United States,
every state bans the execution of the insane and, as discussed in the next
section, that ban has a constitutional basis. In most death penalty states,
however, the execution of the prisoner may take place if the prisoner
regains sanity.24
The ban on executing the insane is accepted in many countries around
the world as well as in international law. s International bodies such as
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights2 6 and United Nations
Economic and Social Council27 condone the ban on the execution of the
z Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 20 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), abrogated by
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986).
22 Ford, 477 U.S. 399.
23 Id. at4o.
24 SeeALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (LexisNexis 1995); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021 (2O01);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 3704 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-101 (West 2009); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. I1, § 406 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West zooI); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-6i
(zoo8); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4006 (2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.2135 (West 2oo6); MASs.
ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 62 (LexisNexis 2002); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57 (West 2oo8); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 552.060 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-202 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537
(zoo8); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.425 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § I5A-Ioo (2007); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. 2949.28 (2OO6); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § z3 A-z 7 A-z 4 (1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-202
(2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-177.1 (2008); see also State v. Allen, 204 La. 513,517 (1943).
25 See, e.g., LEBANESE PENAL CODE, ch. 3, art. 231 (stating that a person who is insane
should not be punished by death). The Japanese Criminal Code provides for a stay of execu-
tion if the condemned is in a "condition of mental derangement," even though the country
does not ban the execution of persons with mental retardation. KEISOHo art. 479; see Simon H.
Fisherow, Follow the Leader?: Japan ShouldFormally Abolish the Execution of the Mentally Retarded
in the Wake of Atkins v. Virginia, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J. 455,463 (2005) (noting that "only two
countries, Japan and Kyrgyzstan, currently do not formally proscribe executions of persons
suffering from mental retardation"); see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON THE DEATH PENALTY, JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 20 (2oo8) (stating that
"[v]irtually all societies refuse to execute an insane person"); Amnesty International, Death
Penalty and Mental Illness, http:llwww.amnestyusa.orgldeath-penalty-facts/death-penalty-
and-mental-illness/page.do?id=I oiO9O&nI=3&n2=28&n3=99 (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
Similarly, many countries embrace the insanity defense. See, e.g., WEI Lou, THE 1997
CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 38, art. 18, (William S. Hein & Co., Inc.
1998) ("A mentally ill person who causes dangerous consequences at a time when he is unable
to recongize or control his own conduct shall not bear criminal responsibility if his mental ill-
ness is verified through certain legal procedures .... ").
26 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Reportto the Econ.
& Soc. Council on the Fifly-Ninth Session, ' 32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/zOo3/L. I I/Add.6 (Apr. 25,
2003) (prepared by Branko Socanac) (urging states that maintain the death penalty not to use
the punishment "on a person suffering from any form of mental disorder or to execute any
such person").
27 ESCOR Res. 1984/50 '1 33, U.N. ESCOR, ist Sess., Supp. No. I, U.N. Doc. E/
RES/1984/5o (May 25, 1984) (adopted by the U.N. Economic and Social Council in 1984
and stating "nor shall the death sentence be carried out ... on persons who have become
2009-2010]
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insane and mentally ill. 8 Although at least as recently as the 1980s a
number of countries-including Kuwait, Morocco, Syria, Czechoslovakia
and Madagascar-did not have an official ban on executing the insane,
there was "no empirical evidence that any state actually executes the
insane." 9 In the international arena, there is a strong argument that "the
prohibition on execution of the insane is a customary norm of international
human rights law."30
B. Policy Behind the Ban on Executing the Insane
The ban on executing the insane has been around so long that some of
the original reasons for the ban may be lost to history. Part of the rationale for
the ban on executing the insane is blurred with the historical development
of the insanity defense to all crimes. 31 One reason for the blurring is that
the insanity defense and other competency claims share some of the same
policy goals as the insanity execution ban. For example, when the time of
execution was close to trial, courts prohibited the execution of the insane
because the insane would not be able to make arguments on their own
behalf at trial.3 Thus, the reasons for the ban on executing the insane
overlapped with the requirement that one be competent to stand trial.
Common-law sources provide at least five possible justifications for the
insane"); see also ESCOR Res. 1989/64151, U.N. ESCOR, ist Sess., Supp. No. I, U.N. Doc.
E/RES/198915o (May 24, 1989) (recommending that UN member states eliminate the death
penalty "for persons suffering from mental retardation or extremely limited mental compe-
tence, whether at the stage of sentence or execution"); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on Extrajudicial, Summary orArbitrary Executions, 1 30, U.N
Doc. E/CN.4/1997/6o (Dec. 24, 1996) (prepared by Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye) (stating that gov-
ernments that retain the death penalty "with respect to minors and the mentally ill are par-
ticularly called upon to bring their domestic criminal laws into conformity with international
legal standards").
z8 Commentators have noted, "By the law of all common law jurisdictions, and, as far
as we know, the law of all civilized nations, a person who is insane cannot be punished."
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution,
9 UCLA L. REV. 381,381 (1962).
29 William A. Schabas, International Norms on Execution of the Insane and the Mentally
Retarded, 4 CRIM. L.F. 95, 112-13 (1993).
30 Id. at 114.
31 See Ebert, supra note 13, at 32 (noting that the competency to be executed require-
ment "is also associated with the insanity defense in its historical background, although it is
distinct in modern practice").
32 Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399,419 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing I MATTHEW
HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 35 (London, E.&R. Nutt 1736)). Insanity
as a general defense was used even before the McNaghten standard developed in 1843. See
V.A.C. GATRELL, TkE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 1770-1 868 554-55
(1994) (discussing a successful use of the insanity defense in 1822 for a horse thief named
Matthew Verney, even though "in the 182os the defense was rarely pleaded or accepted at
the Old Bailey").
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ban. The first two of the justifications often used for the ban are based on
two policies behind criminal punishment: deterrence and retribution.
First, the punishment goal of deterrence is not served by the execution
of the insane because the execution of an insane person does not set much
of an example.33 It will not deter other insane people, and, if there is
any deterrence value to the death penalty, sane people will be deterred
adequately by the execution of the sane. In the early 1600s, Sir Edward
Coke explained that the execution of the insane is such "'a miserable
spectacle... of extream inhumanity and cruelty' that it 'can be no example
to others." '34
Second, the punishment goal of retribution is not served by the
execution of the insane for several reasons that relate to the quality and
quantity of retribution. Some argue that retribution is not served because
the "moral quality" of executing an insane person is less than that of the
crime.35 Another way that retribution is not served, especially in situations
where the condemned became insane after the crime, is that executing an
insane person is not punishing the sane person who actually committed
the crime.36 Phrased another way, Justice Frankfurter asked, "If a man has
gone insane, is he still himself? Is he still the man who was convicted?"37
Further, some argue that execution is unnecessary to achieve the goal
of retribution because the insane person already suffers. As William
Blackstone explained, "a madman is punished by his madness alone."38
The third and fourth justifications for the ban are based on humanitarian
grounds. The third justification for the ban is that the execution of the
insane "offends humanity."39 The fourth, a similar justification, has a
religious foundation: the condemned should not be executed while
unable to prepare for the afterlife.40 These two points were made by Sir
33 Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
34 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE TYIIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6
(London, E. & R. Brooke 1797), quoted in Ford, 477 U.S. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring); see
generally SIR EDWARD COKE, ThE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (2d
ed., London, John More 1629) (1628).
35 Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (citing Hazard & Louisell, supra note 27, at 387).
36 "If the natural death of the body of one condemned may stay the hand of the execu-
tioner, it must follow in reason and justice that the death of the mind should have like effect.
For it may well be questioned whether the petitioner is the same as he who was convicted."
Musselwhite v. State, 60 So. 2d 807, 8I I (Miss. I952).
37 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, I9 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), abrogated by
Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
38 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *24. Blackstone actually wrote of this principle ap-
plying the insanity defense to all punishments, but the same reasoning applies to the ban on
executing the insane. See id.
39 Ford, 339 U.S. at 407 (citing COKE, supra note 17, at 6).
40 Id. at 419-20 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Hawles, supra note I I, at 477). One attor-
ney has argued that the theological basis for this argument is supported by the works of Saint
Thomas Aquinas; it is "rebutted by Archbishop William Temple, who dismissed the view that
2009-20101
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John Hawles, Solicitor-General to the Courts of King William III, when he
argued, "[Ilt is inconsistent with humanity to make Examples of them; it
is inconsistent with Religion, as being against Christian charity, to send a
great Offender quick, as it is stiled, into another World, when he is not of a
capacity to fit himself for it."'"
The fifth justification for the ban on executing the insane is based on
procedural concerns-it helps ensure a fair and accurate process. 4 For
example, historically when the time of execution was close to trial, courts
prohibited the execution of the insane because the insane would not be
able to make arguments on their own behalf at trial.43 Regarding this last
point, even though today there is a longer period of time between trial and
execution, similar reasoning applies. Today, an insane person would not be
able to assist counsel in the post-conviction and appellate process.
Concerning this last justification, in the 1700s Blackstone discussed
the concerns about punishing the insane in terms of fairness of the legal
process and the risk of executing one who does not deserve to be executed:
"[I1f, after judgment, [a person] becomes of nonsane memory, execution
shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had
the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in
stay of judgment or execution." 4
'eternal destiny depends in any degree on the frame of mind you were in at the particular
moment of death rather than on the general tenor of the life."' Barbara A. Ward, Competency
for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 51 (1986) (citing Hazard
& Louisell, supra note 28, at 388 (quoting SIR ERNEST A. GOWERS, A LIFE FOR A LIFE? ThE
PROBLEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT I 13 (1 956))).
41 JOHN HAWLES, REMARKS UPON THE TYALS 102 (London, Jacob Tonfon 1689), quoted in
Dupler, supra note 19, at 12.
42 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *24-25 (explaining that in situations where an
insane prisoner is executed, "had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged
something in stay of judgment or execution").
43 Ford, 477 U.S. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing HALE, supra note 32, at 35).
44 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *24-25.
[A] case of a deficiency in will, which excuses from the guilt of
crimes, arises also from a defective or vitiated understanding, viz. in an
idiot or a lunatic. For the rule of law as to the latter, which may easily
be adapted also to the former, is, that "furiosusfurore solum punitur." In
criminal cases therefore idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their
own acts, if committed when under these incapacities .... Also, if a man
in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment
for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he
is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And
if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried;
for how can he make his defence? If, after he be tried and found guilty,
he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced;
and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall
be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had
[Vol. 98
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More recent commentators have expanded upon this fair and accurate
process justification. These commentators note that the ban on executing
the insane acts as an insurance measure or "double check" for other
mental health claims that may not have been properly evaluated earlier
in the process. 4 For example, an inmate may be found incompetent to be
executed when that person should have earlier been found incompetent to
stand trial, mentally retarded, or incapable of forming the mens rea for the
crime. 46
Although the ban has been around for centuries, courts still struggle
with establishing a clear definition for determining whether or not one is
competent to be executed.47 In the early English common law, courts had
to operate without modern medicine and psychiatry, so determinations
the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in
stay of judgment or execution (footnote omitted). Indeed, in the bloody
reign of Henry the eighth, a statute was made (footnote omitted), which
enacted, that if a person, being compos mentis, should commit high trea-
son, and after fall into madness, he might be tried in his absence, and
should suffer death, as if he were of perfect memory. But this savage and
inhuman law was repealed by the statute I & 2 Ph. & M. c. io. "For, as
is observed by Sir Edward Coke (footnote omitted), the execution of
an offender is for example, utpoena adpaucos, metus ad omnes pervnia.
but so it is not when a madman is executed; but should be a miserable
spectacle, both against law, and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and
can be no example to others." But if there be any doubt, whether the
party be compos or not, this shall be tried by a jury. And if he be so found,
a total idiocy, or absolute insanity, excuses from the guilt, and of course
from the punishment, of any criminal action committed under such de-
privation of the senses: but, if a lunatic hath lucid intervals of under-
standing, he shall answer for what he does in those intervals, as if he had
no deficiency (footnote omitted). Yet, in the case of absolute madmen,
as they are not answerable for their actions, they should not be permit-
ted the liberty of acting unless under proper control; and, in particular,
they ought not to be suffered to go loose, to the terror of the king's
subjects. It was the doctrine of our ancient law, that persons deprived of
their reason might be confined till they recovered their senses (footnote
omitted), without waiting for the forms of a commission or other special
authority from the crown: and now, by the vagrant acts (footnote omit-
ted), a method is chalked out for imprisoning, chaining, and sending
them to their proper homes.
Id; see also Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 19-20 (195o) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating
that were an insane person instead of sound memory, the person might be able to raise a claim
"to save himself from doom"), abrogated by Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
45 MILLER & RADELET, supra note 12, at 4.
46 Id.
47 The Supreme Court has also had to resolve when the claim may be raised in federal
habeas corpus proceedings. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945 (zoo7) (concluding
that execution competency claims do not have to be raised in initial habeas corpus petitions to
preserve any possible claims); see also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 639 (1998).
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of competency to be executed were based on general principles without
definitive standards. 4s By the late seventeenth century and the time of
the British jurist Sir Matthew Hale, British courts "provided procedural
safeguards for those judged to have been insane at the time of their
offenses or to have become insane thereafter. ' 49 Yet, "neither Hale nor
his contemporaries found it necessary to include provision for medical
specialists to inform or otherwise guide jurors."5 0 Even today, with a better
understanding of psychiatry and medicine, modern courts continue to work
on refining the definition for when one is incompetent to be executed.
II. THIE SUPREME COURT AND EXECUTION COMPETENCY
In a number of cases, the Court has addressed issues related to the
competency of criminal defendants, such as issues about insanity at the
time of the crime as a defense' and whether the Eighth Amendment bans
the execution of those who are mentally retarded." The Court, however,
first considered an issue regarding competency to be executed in 1897 in
Nobles v. Georgia,3 where the Court held that an inmate on death row did
not have a federal constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of whether
the inmate was incompetent to be executed.'
Although the Court considered due process claims regarding
competency procedures in earlier cases, the Court did not directly address
the standard for competency to be executed until relatively recently. In
48 See Christopher Seeds, The Afterlife of Ford and Panetti: Execution Competence and the
Capacity to Assist Counsel, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 309,314-17 (2009).
49 ROBINSON, supra note 12, at 12 1.
50 Id. Hale "was more forward-looking than Coke and certainly more concerned to work
out the subtler aspects of insanity in relation to law." Id. at i 17. Although Hale's writings on
insanity were progressive for the times, in other capacities, Hale still was influenced by the
views of his time. See id. at I 17-18. For example, as a judge in 1665, he presided over a trial
of two widows accused of witchcraft, instructing the jury to consider the authority of both
Parliament and Scripture regarding the existence of witches. Id. The two women were found
guilty and executed, with Hale's position eventually being influential on the Salem witch
trials. Id. at i18.
51 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,331-34 (1989) (discussing the common-law history
of the insanity defense), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-21
(2002).
52 See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (overruling Pentry, 492 U.S. at 302, and holding that it
violates the Eighth Amendment to execute one who is mentally retarded). Another related
area involves the issue of whether a capital defendant who wishes to volunteer for execu-
tion is competent to waive post-conviction review. See, e.g., Paula Shapiro, Comment, Are We
Executing Mentally Incompetent Inmates Because They Volunteer to Die?: A Look at Various States'
Implementation of Standards of Competency to Waive Post-Conviction Review, 57 CATH. U. L. REv.
567, 567-72 (2008).
53 Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
54 Id. at 409.
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one early case considering whether state procedures violated due process,
Justice Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion in Solesbee v. Balkcom, s cited
state court decisions to suggest that the standard for competency to be
executed is as follows:
[W]hether the prisoner has not "from the defects of his
faculties, sufficient intelligence to understand the nature
of the proceedings against him, what he was tried for, the
purpose of his punishment, the impending fate which
awaits him, a sufficient understanding to know any fact
which might exist which would make his punishment
unjust or unlawful, and the intelligence requisite to
convey such information to his attorneys or the court."5
This standard was not adopted by the Court, but there are two more recent
significant decisions by the United States Supreme Court regarding the
standard for execution competency under the Eighth Amendment."
A. Ford v. Wainwright: Constitutionalizing the Ban
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court first considered the
application of the Eighth Amendment to a claim of incompetency to be
executed in Ford v. Wainwright 8 Justice Marshall began the majority
opinion by noting, "For centuries no jurisdiction has countenanced the
55 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (195o) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), abrogated by
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
56 Id. at 2o n.3 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Smith, 176 P. 819, 823 (N.M.
1918)).
57 The Court had considered execution competency in earlier cases. In Solesbee, the
Supreme Court held that Georgia's procedures to determine sanity did not violate due pro-
cess in the context of the state's own ban on executing the insane. Solesbee, 399 U.S. at 13-14,
abrogated by Ford, 477 U.S. at 405. At the time of Solesbee, however, the Court had not yet ap-
plied the Eighth Amendment to the states. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 405. Dissenting in Solesbee,
Justice Frankfurter stated that "[aifter sentence of death, the test of insanity is whether the
prisoner [can] understand [inter alia] the impending fate which awaits him." Solesbee, 339
U.S. at 2o n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated by Ford, 477 U.S. at 4o5; see also
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 550 (1958) (per curium) (upholding a California proce-
dure that allowed only the prison warden to initiate competency proceedings); United States
ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 569-71 (1953) (holding that the state court's hearing on the
insanity defense did not violate due process while Justice Frankfurter's dissent also discusses
some principles regarding competency to be executed); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431, 444
(1948) (finding lack of jurisdiction to address issue of whether the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment bars the execution of the insane); Nobles, 168 U.S. at 409 (hold-
ing that a condemned inmate does not have a constitutional right to jury trial on the issue of
insanity arising after trial and before execution and that it is up to states to determine the
competency standard).
58 Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
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execution of the insane, yet this Court has never decided whether the
Constitution forbids the practice."5 9
When Alvin Ford was sentenced to death in 1974, his attorney did not
raise any competency issues.6° But eight years later while Ford was serving
time on death row, his behavior began to change and he was evaluated by
psychiatrists who found that he had a major mental disorder. Ford had
delusions that relatives were being tortured in the prison, that he was
"Pope John Paul, III," that he "appointed nine new justices to the Florida
Supreme Court," and that he could not be executed. 6' One psychiatrist
found that Ford had "a severe, uncontrollable, mental disease which
closely resembles 'Paranoid Schizophrenia With Suicide Potential,'" 6 and
another doctor found that Ford had "no understanding of why he was being
executed." 63
Ford's attorneys followed Florida's legal procedures regarding
competency, resulting in the Florida Governor appointing a panel of three
psychiatrists who all concluded that Ford was sane.64 After the governor
signed a warrant for Ford's execution, Ford's attorneys unsuccessfully
sought a new state court hearing on competency.6 Following the denial of
Ford's petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the federal district court and
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari
to decide the two issues of "whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of the insane and, if so, whether the [d]istrict [clourt should have
held a hearing on petitioner's claim." 66
Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion concluding that the Eighth
Amendment bans the execution of an insane prisoner.67 Although he noted
that the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment requires consideration
of "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
59 Id. at 4oi.
60 Id. Prior to the murder in the case, Ford had been a prison guard with no violent
criminal record. MILLER & RADELET, SUpra note 12, at 159. "The murder had not been espe-
cially heinous or premeditated - Ford had panicked during a botched robbery attempt. His
years in prison were marked by misery and madness." Id. at I59-6o.
61 Ford, 477 U.S. at 402-03.
6z Id.
63 Id. at 403.
64 "[Tlhe Governor of Florida appointed a panel of three psychiatrists to evaluate
whether ... Ford had 'the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty
and the reasons why it was imposed upon him."' Id. at 403-04. The three psychiatrists each
reached a different diagnosis, but they all concluded he was sane under state law. Id. at 404.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 404-05.
67 Id. at 409-1o. Although Justice Marshall's Ford opinion was the majority opinion re-
garding the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment bans the execution of an insane per-
son, the portion of his opinion addressing Florida's statutory procedures for determining a
prisoner's sanity was a plurality opinion. Id. at 399-400.
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society,"68 Justice Marshall began his analysis with the common law because,
at a minimum, the ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits "those
modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual
at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted. 69
After noting that "the bar against executing a prisoner who has lost his
sanity bears impressive historical credentials," 70 Justice Marshall discussed
works by William Blackstone and Sir Edward Coke, who both wrote about
the common-law ban on executing the insane.71 Justice Marshall noted
that the historical reasons for the ban were somewhat vague.7"
Then Justice Marshall listed several explanations that have been used
to justify the ban.73 First, he noted that Coke had provided the justification
that executing the insane "offends humanity. ' 74 Second, execution of the
insane does not set an example for others and does not serve "whatever
deterrence value is intended to be served by capital punishment.,75 Third,
Justice Marshall cited Sir John Hawles' religious justification in that "it is
uncharitable to dispatch an offender 'into another world, when he is not
of a capacity to fit himself for it."' 76 Fourth, Blackstone had considered
that execution was unnecessary because insanity was its own punishment:
"furiosussolofurorepunitur."17 Fifth, Justice Marshall noted that more recent
commentators had concluded that retribution is not served by executing
the insane because the "moral quality" of executing an insane offender is
less than that of the crime. 78 A sixth reason appears in a Blackstone quote
used by Justice Marshall: an insane prisoner is unable to assist counsel
arguing for a stay of judgment or execution. 79
Despite the lack of a uniform justification, Justice Marshall stressed the
68 Id. at 406 (quotingTrop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, io (1958) (plurality opinion)).
69 Id. at 405.
70 Id. at 406.
7' Id. at 406-07.
72 Id. at 407 (citing OLIVER W HOLMES, TYIE COMMON LAW 5 (Boston, Little, Brown, and
Company 188 I) ("As is often true of common-law principles.., the reasons for the rule are less
sure and less uniform than the rule itself .... ).
73 The justifications listed by Justice Marshall reflect the same ones discussed in Part
I.B. See supra Part I.B. In Part I.B., Justice Marshall's fourth justification of insanity being its
own punishment is categorized as part of the retribution rationale. See supra pp. at 269.
74 Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (citing COKE, supra note 17, at 6).
75 Id. (citing COKE, supra note 17, at 6).
76 Id. (citing Hawles, supra note I I, at 477).
77 Id. at 407-08 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *24-25). Blackstone actually wrote
of this principle applying the insanity defense to all punishments, but Justice Marshall was
correct that the same reasoning would apply to the ban on executing the insane. Id. This
policy argument is similar to the argument that retributive goals are not served by executing
the insane, thus it is categorized under retribution in Part I.B of this Article. See supra p. 269.
78 Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (citing Hazard & Louisell, supra note 28, at 387).
79 Id. at 406-07 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, SUpra note 18, at *24-25).
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"impressive historical credentials"80 of the ban, which carried over from
England into early America and through the time of the Ford decision,
when "no State in the Union permit[ted] the execution of the insane."81
Justice Marshall reasoned that the arguments against executing the insane
were still sound. He noted that there is questionable retributive value
in "executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been
singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life."82 He stressed the
"intuition" that the execution of the insane "offends humanity,"' and that it
is uncivilized to kill "one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own
conscience or deity." 4 Thus, he concluded that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of the insane "[w]hether its aim be to protect the
condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to
protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless
vengeance."8
After determining that the insane may not be executed, the Justices
considered the definition of insanity and the necessary procedures for
determining insanity. In a part of his opinion that was only joined by three
other Justices, Justice Marshall concluded that the district court should
have held an evidentiary hearing to determine Ford's competence to be
executed and that the state court procedures were inadequate. 6 Although
he discussed several reasons why the state procedures were insufficient, he
did not provide a legal test or standard for determining competency to be
executed.87
The standard from Ford that lower courts ultimately would follow was
in the concurring opinion by Justice Powell.8  He noted that the standard
8o Id. at 406.
81 Id. at 408. Under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the fact that no state allows the
execution of the insane would illustrate that there is a national consensus against the execu-
tion of the insane under "evolving standards of decency." Id. at 406; see, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304,314-17 (2002) (finding a national consensus against the execution of individuals
who are mentally retarded).
82 Ford, 477 U.S. at 409 (citing Larkin, supra note 12, at 477 n.58).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 41o.
86 Id.
87 See id. at 426-27 (the opinions by Justice Marshall and by Justice Powell contemplate
that the burden of proving incompetency to be executed may be placed upon the prisoner).
88 This test has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court and followed elsewhere.
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304,314-21 (zoo). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2006) ("A sentence of death shall not
be carried out upon a person who, as a result of mental disability, lacks the mental capacity to
understand the death penalty and why it was imposed on that person."); Scott v. Mitchell, z5o
F3d 1I1, 1014 (6th Cir. 2oo); Massie v. Woodford, 244 F3d 1192, 1195 n.1 (9th Cit. 2001);
Fearance v. Scott, 56 F3d 633 , 640 (5th Cir. 1995); Rector v. Clark, 923 Fzd 570, 572 (8th Cir.
1991); Walton v. Johnson, 44o E3d i6o, 171 (4th Cir. 2oo6) (noting that "all four federal cir-
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used in Florida "appropriately defin[ed] the kind of mental deficiency
that should trigger the Eighth Amendment prohibition."'  The standard
prohibits the execution of individuals who "'do not have the mental
capacity to understand [1] the nature of the death penalty and [21 why it
was imposed' on them."9
In supporting this standard, Justice Powell began with a consideration
of the various justifications for the ban on executing the insane. He found
the retributive justification and humanity justification legitimate concerns,
but he downplayed the fair and accurate process justification.9 Regarding
the latter, he reasoned that the procedural concerns have "slight merit
today" because of modern development.9"
Justice Powell's standard-requiring capacity to understand the nature
of the punishment and why it was imposed-was based upon the humanity
and retribution justifications.93 He noted that the humanity concerns
about executing the insane are valid, and that it is true "that most men and
women value the opportunity to prepare, mentally and spiritually, for their
death." 94 He also focused on the retributive goal in fashioning a standard
that required understanding the nature of the death penalty and the
reason for its imposition. 95 He concluded that the retributive goal of the
death penalty is only achieved if the defendant is aware "of the penalty's
existence and purpose." 96
In a dissenting opinion joined by ChiefJustice Burger, Justice Rehnquist
rejected the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
cuit courts that have addressed competency to be executed have recognized Justice Powell's
proffered test as the appropriate standard by which to determine competence"). In Paneti
v. Quarterman, the Supreme Court noted that "Justice Powell's opinion [in Foral constitutes
'clearly established' law for purposes of [habeas corpus claims] and sets the minimum proce-
dures a State must provide to a prisoner raising a Ford-based competency claim." Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007).
89 Ford, 477 U.S. at 422.
90 Id. at 421 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 2001)).
91 Id. at 419-22. Justice Powell noted that a common-law justification for the ban on
the execution of the insane was to ensure that capital defendants could present arguments
on their own behalf; yet, he concluded that such a justification did not apply in modern times
because of changes in rights and procedures, such as the right to counsel and the fact that a
defendant must be competent to stand trial. Id. at 419-21.
92 Id. at 420.
93 Justice Powell noted that his Eighth Amendment standard served these two legiti-
mate justifications for the ban on executing the insane: "If the defendant perceives the con-
nection between his crime and his punishment, the retributive goal of the criminal law is
satisfied. And only if the defendant is aware that his death is approaching can he prepare
himself for his passing." Id. at 422.
94 Id. at 42 1.
95 Id. at 422-23.
96 Id. at 422.
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execution of the insane.97 He attacked the majority's reliance on common
law by noting that at common law it was up to the executive to determine
whether or not a condemned person was insane.9" He also noted that the
Supreme Court in Solesbee v. Balkcom9 had focused on the executive role in
addressing claims of incompetence to be executed.' ° Justice Rehnquist,
however, did not attack the reasoning for the ban on executing the insane.
He only concluded that it was unnecessary for the Court to create a new
constitutional right when every state already prohibited the execution of
the insane. 101
The decision in Ford left open many questions about the legal
standard. 0 For Alvin Ford, it sent his case back to district court for an
evidentiary hearing."3 In district court, the majority of experts testified
that Ford was psychotic or seriously disturbed, but the judge agreed with
experts who claimed that Ford was malingering and not mentally ill.' 4 The
case was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
and in 1990 a three judge panel heard oral arguments on the case. 105 One
of the arguments in the case focused on the issue of what to do if an inmate
cycled in and out of a psychotic state, alternating between competency and
incompetency depending on the day.'16 Before the court could rule on the
case, however, Alvin Ford fell ill in prison and then died two days later in
the hospital on February 28, 1991.17 Thus, the competency litigation and
his untimely death kept Alvin Ford from being executed, but the question
of his competency was never resolved.
B. Panetti v. Quarterman: Rational Understanding and Trying to Clarify the
Standard with a "[H]af-[B]aked [H]olding"10 8
The other major Supreme Court case addressing the execution of the
97 Id. at 431-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 431 (citing I WALKER, supra note 12, at 194-203).
99 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 1-12 (195o), abrogated by Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
IOO Ford, 477 U.S. at 432 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1O Id. at 435.
102 See, e.g., Rector v. Bryant, 5o U.S. 1239, 1241 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dis-
agreeing with denial of petition for writ of certiorari and asserting that the Ford Court did not
create a test for execution competency).
103 Ford, 477 U.S. at 418.
104 MILLER & RADELET, supra note 12, at 155.
105 Id. at 158.
Io6 Id.
107 Id. at 158-59 ("[Ford's] autopsy report listed 'acute respiratory distress syndrome as-
sociated with fulminant acute pancreatitis' as the cause of death.").
io8 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 978 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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insane is Panelti v. Quarterman.'° Among the issues in the case was the
standard for determining competency to be executed and, in particular,
whether one is incompetent if "mental illness obstructs a rational
understanding of the State's reason for his execution."'"10
Scott Panetti, who had a long history of mental illness, was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death in Texas."' Prior to killing his estranged
wife's mother and father and kidnapping his wife and daughter, Panetti had
been hospitalized numerous times for disorders that included a fragmented
personality, delusions, and hallucinations."' Later, district court experts
concluded that Panetti had delusions, with one expert finding that while
Panetti said he understood the State's claim that it was executing him
for the murders, Panetti believed that the reason was "a 'sham' and that
the State in truth wanted to execute him 'to stop him from preaching."'"1 3
Thus, Panetti understood what the State said were the reasons for his
punishment, but, because of mental illness, he did not believe the State.
After the trial court set an execution date, Panetti "made a substantial
showing" of incompetency to be executed but the state court rejected
the claim." 4 After Panetti filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
lost in the lower federal courts, the case went to the Supreme Court."5 In
evaluating the proper standard for determining competency to be executed,
the Court focused on Panetti's belief that the State was going to execute
him to stop him from preaching, even though he understood that the State
claimed to be executing him for his murders. 16
The Court held in an opinion by Justice Kennedy that the state court
failed to provide the procedures required by the Constitution and that
the federal appellate court used an overly restrictive test to determine
competency."7  The court of appeals had applied a standard that
IO9 Id. at 934-35.
Io Id. at 956-57.
I I Id. at 935-36. On the afternoon of the killings, Panetti told the police that
"Sarge" did the killings. Jordan Smith, Is Scott Panetti Sane Enough to Die?, THE AUSTIN
CHRONICLE, Sept. 17, 2004, at 24, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/
story?oid=oid%3A2z9342. "Sarge" was later identified as Panetti's recurring auditory halluci-
nation. Id. At the time of Panetti's trial, Panetti, who had stopped taking his medication, rep-
resented himself, appeared in court in a purple cowboy outfit, and tried to subpoena close to
200 witnesses such as Jesus Christ and John E Kennedy. Id. For a detailed discussion of Scott
Panetti's background and mental illness, see AMNESTY INT'L, "WHERE IS THE COMPASSION?"
THE IMMINENT EXECUTION OF SCO'TT PANETri, MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 1-3(2004), available at
http://www.amnesty.orglen/library/info/AMR 5 1/O 11/2004.
112 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 935-36.
113 Id. at 954-55 (citation omitted).
114 Id. at 935.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 954-55.
117 Id. at 935. Regarding the issue of proper procedures, the Supreme Court, applying
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concluded that a prisoner is competent if the prisoner is aware (1) that
she or he is going to be executed and (2) why she or he is going to be
executed." 8 Applying that standard, the court of appeals held that Panetti
was competent because he was aware: that he committed the murders; that
he will be executed; and that the state's reason for executing him was the
murders.11 9 Panetti's attorneys, however, argued that Panetti did not have
a rational understanding of why the State was executing him because due
to his mental illness, he believed the State was executing him to stop him
from preaching. 2 0
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals standard was incorrect
because Fordv. Wainright requires an inquiry into whether a prisoner has a
rational understanding of the State's reasons for execution. '2 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court noted language from the Ford plurality that
prohibited the execution of "one whose mental illness prevents him from
comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications."'' 22  The
Court also pointed to language in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Ford that "the Eighth Amendment 'forbids the execution only of those
who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they
are to suffer it. 12 3
In requiring a rational understanding, the Court also considered the
reasoning behind the EighthAmendment ban on executing the incompetent.
Although it pointed out the various reasons mentioned in Justice Marshall's
a habeas standard of review that limits the Court to "clearly established" law, relied upon
Justice Powell's Ford concurrence for the procedural requirements because there was no ma-
jority opinion and his holding on that issue was the most narrow. Id. at 949 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (zoo6)). Applying that standard, the Court concluded that once Panetti had made a
"substantial threshold showing of insanity," he was entitled to a "'fair hearing' in accord with
fundamental fairness." Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399,426,424 (1986) (citations
omitted)). Such a hearing requires that the condemned be given an opportunity to be heard
and be affored basic due process requirements such as an opportunity for defense counsel to
submit evidence. Id. at 949-50.
118 Id. at 956 (citing Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F3d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 2oo6)).
119 Id. (citing Dretke, 448 E3d at 817).
120 Id. at 954-55.
121 Id. at 959-60.
1zz Id. at 957 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 417). Some have argued that, although previous
courts assumed Justice Powell's Ford concurring opinion was the standard, Panetti returned
the focus to the majority opinion in Ford. See, e.g., Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d I44, 172
(Ind. 2007) (stating that in Paneti the "Court departed from the Justice Powell formulation
and expanded upon the Eighth Amendment's reach for persons with mental illness").
123 Paneti, 551 U.S. at 957 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring)).
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Fordopinion, 1z4 the Court focused on the retribution rationale."5 In order
for retribution to be served, the offender must recognize the severity of
the crimes and the goals of "community vindication."'' 26 If a prisoner's
mental illness distorts comprehension of the connection between crime,
punishment, and the community's understanding of those concepts, then
retribution is not served. 27
The Court concluded that the lower court decisions did not properly
consider whether Panetti had a rational understanding of the connection
between his crime and punishment. But it refused to "attempt to set down
a rule governing all competency determinations."'2 8
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion joined by three other
Justices that attacked several holdings by the majority.2 9 Regarding the
competency standard, Justice Thomas did not address whether or not the
court of appeals' standard was correct, but he did criticize Justice Kennedy's
124 See supra p. 275. The Panetti Court's emphasis on Justice Marshall's Ford opinion for
the rationale, instead of on Justice Powell's concurring opinion, arguably indicates the Court's
willingness to consider a broader range of justifications for the ban in its analysis. See Seeds,
supra note 48, at 332-39.
125 Paneti, 551 U.S. at 958-60.
126 Id. at 958. Considering retribution, the Court stated as follows:
[Ilt might be said that capital punishment is imposed because it has the
potential to make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime
and to allow the community as a whole, including the surviving family
and friends of the victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability
of the prisoner is so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought
and imposed.
Id.
127 Id. at 958-59. The Court explained as follows:
The potential for a prisoner's recognition of the severity of the offense
and the objective of community vindication are called in question...
if the prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his
awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the
understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole.
Id.
128 Id. at 96o-61. Similarly, in Indiana v. Edwards, the Court recently declined to adopt
a specific standard for when courts may withhold the right to self-representation from men-
tally ill defendants found competent to stand trial. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2388
(zoo8).
129 The dissenters were Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia and
Justice Alito. Paneti, 551 U.S. at 962 (Thomas, J., dissenting). One of the arguments made by
the dissenters was that because this competency issue first arose in Panetti's second habeas
corpus petition, it should not be heard under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996. Id. at 963-64 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006)). Justice
Thomas also disagreed with the majority's conclusion finding constitutional violations in the
procedures used to determine Panetti's competency. Id. at 972-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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opinion for relying on the "muddled" Ford opinion to address an issue that
was not presented in that case.130 He concluded, "[Wihat emerges [from
the majority opinion] is a half-baked holding that leaves the details of the
insanity standard for the [dlistrict [c]ourt to work out."'13'
On remand, the district court did work out the details of the insanity
standard, and it found Panetti to be competent to be executed. 3 ' District
Court Judge Sam Sparks read the Supreme Court's opinion to clearly
require a baseline definition of insanity: "[Tihe test for competence to be
executed involves not only a prisoner's factual awareness of the crime, the
impending execution, and the state's reason for executing the prisoner, but
also some degree of 'rational understanding' of the connection between the
crime and punishment."'33 Applying the standard, Judge Sparks found that
Panetti is "seriously mentally ill," 134 but that "his delusions do not prevent
his rational understanding of the causal connection between [the] murders
and his death sentence, and he in fact has such an understanding."'35 Scott
Panetti is still on death row in Texas. 36
III. STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF EXECUTION COMPETENCY AND LOWER
COURT DECISIONS REGARDING DEATH COMPREHENSION
Even though in recent years the Supreme Court has come nearer to
establishing a standard for execution competency, one issue that is now
arising in lower courts is whether the standard requires a prisoner to have a
rational understanding of death itself. In other words, if a defendant, due
to a mental disease or defect, does not understand the full implications of
the meaning of death, is the defendant competent to be executed? This
issue may arise in situations where, due to a mental impairment, a capital
defendant believes she or he will survive execution or somehow believes
130 Id. at 978-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas emphasized that the majority
focused upon the word "aware" in Ford, even though that case did not define the term or ad-
dress the issue presented in Panenti. Id.
131 Id. at 978 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also criticized the majority for
merely focusing on the language of Ford and for not considering evolving "standards of de-
cency" as it does in other Eighth Amendment cases. Id. at 980 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,312 (2002)).
132 Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-o4-CA-o42-SS, 2oo8 WL 2338498, at *37 (W.D. Tex.
March 26, 2oo8).
133 Id. at *31 (quoting Paneti, 551 U.S. at 958).
134 Id. at *36.
135 Id. Judge Sparks concluded, "Therefore, if any mentally ill person is competent to
be executed for his crimes, this record establishes it is Scott Panetti." Id. at *37.
136 Deborah Fins, NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., Death Row USA Winter
2oo9, at 64 (2009), availabk at http://www.naacpldf.orglcontentlpdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSA_
Winter_2009.pdf; Tx. DEP'T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, OFFENDERS ON DEATH Row, http://www.
tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/offendersondrow.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
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the execution will not result in physical death.
A. Statutory Definitions of Competency to Be Executed
Although every state bans the execution of an insane prisoner, many
state statutes provide little guidance regarding the standard for competency.
Many state statutes on execution competency do not define competency at
all.1
37
States that do have statutory definitions for execution competency
require an understanding or awareness of the crime and corresponding
punishment.138 Additionally, some jurisdictions add to this cognitive prong
137 See Panetti, zoo8 WL 2338498, at *30 (noting a number of states that do not define
competency to be executed); see e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (LexisNexis 1995); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 3701 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-101 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I I,
§ 406 (2007); IND. CODE ANN. § I I-10-4-2 (LexisNexis 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4006 (2007);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 62 (LexisNexis 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (zoo8); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 176.425 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-220 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-2 7 A-22
(2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-177.1 (2OO8); see also State v. Allen, 15 So. 2d 87 o, 871-72 (La.
1943) (explaining the procedure for determining if one is not competent to be executed, but
failing to define competency); cf. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752-53 (2oo6) (noting that in
the context of the Due Process Clause, no single definition of insanity has developed).
138 SeePaneti, 2oo8 WL 2338498, at *30; seeARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021 (2001) (stat-
ing that "'mentally incompetent to be executed' means that due to a mental disease or defect
a person who is sentenced to death is presently unaware that he is to be punished for the crime
of murder or that he is unaware that the impending punishment for that crime is death"); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 2001) (requiring a determination of "whether he or she understands
the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed upon him or her"); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-IO-60 (2008) ("'[Mlentally incompetent to be executed' means that because
of a mental condition the person is presently unable to know why he or she is being punished
and understand the nature of the punishment."); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.213(2) (West 2006)
("'[Ilnsane' means the condemned person does not have the ability to understand: (a) That
the person is about to be executed; and (b) Why the person is to be executed."); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-57 (West zoo6 & Supp. 2008) (requiring a finding "that the offender does not
have sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, what
he was tried for, the purpose of his punishment, the impending fate that awaits him, and a
sufficient understanding to know any fact that might exist that would make his punishment
unjust or unlawful and the intelligence requisite to convey that information to his attorneys
or the court"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.060 (West 2002) (forbidding execution "if as a result of
mental disease or defect [the offender] lacks capacity to understand the nature and purpose
of the punishment about to be imposed upon him or matters in extenuation, arguments for
executive clemency or reasons why the sentence should not be carried out"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-101 (2) (2007) ("'[Mlental disease or defect' means an organic, mental, or emo-
tional disorder that is manifested by a substantial disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking,
or judgment to such an extent that the person requires care, treatment, and rehabilitation.");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § I5A-lool (2007) (forbidding punishment "when by reason of mental illness
or defect [the offender] is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in
his defense in a rational or reasonable manner"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2949.28 (LexisNexis
2oo6 & Supp. 2009) ("'[Ilnsane' means that the convict in question does not have the mental
capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed upon the con-
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and also require an assistance prong, i.e., that in order to be competent a
defendant must be able to assist counsel.'39 The American Bar Association
standard for incompetency includes both a cognitive/awareness prong and
an assistance prong.140 A 2005 Position Statement of the Board of Trustees
of the American Psychiatric Association also advocates for a similar two-
pronged analysis.' In his concurring opinion in Fordv. Wainright, however,
Justice Powell rejected the argument that the Constitution requires an
assistance prong in the standard for competency to be executed. 4 ' Although
vict .... ); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-201 (2007) ("'[llncompetent to be executed' means that,
due to mental condition, an inmate is unaware of either the punishment he is about to suffer
or why he is to suffer it."); Wyo. STAr. ANN. § 7-13-901(a)(v) (2009) (requiring "the ability to
understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons it was imposed").
139 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § I5A-iooi (2007) (forbidding punishment "when by reason
of mental illness or defect [the offender] is unable.., to assist in his defense in a rational or
reasonable manner"); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.zd 53, 57 (S.C. i993) (explaining that the
assistance prong originated from Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Solesbee v. Balkcom); see also
John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Carrying Out Death Sentences Against Mentally Ill
Individuals, l II A.L.R.5th 491, 509-12 (2003) (discussing cases using an assistance prong as
part of the standard).
14o The ABA standard states:
A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental
illness or mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature
of the pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason
for the punishment, or the nature of the punishment. A convict is also
incompetent if, as a result of mental illness or retardation, the convict
lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or understand any fact which might
exist which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the
ability to convey such information to counsel or the court.
CRIMNAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.6, at 29o (1989).
141 The Position Statement provides:
Grounds for Precluding Execution. A sentence of death should not
be carried out if the prisoner has a mental disorder or disability that
significantly impairs his or her capacity (i) to make a rational decision to
forego or terminate post-conviction proceedings available to challenge the
validity of the conviction or sentence; (ii) to understand or communicate
pertinent information, or otherwise assist counsel, in relation to specific
claims bearing on the validity of the conviction or sentence that
cannot be fairly resolved without the prisoner's participation; or (iii) to
understand the nature and purpose of the punishment, or to appreciate
the reason for its imposition in the prisoner's own case.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS ON DEATH, POSITION STATEMENT (2005),
http://www.psych.org/Departments/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocumentsandRelated/Posi
tionStatements/2005o5.aspx; see also Seeds, supra note 48, at 338-48 (arguing for the assis-
tance prong); Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Il/Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts
andLegislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 I69, 1177-8o (zoo5) (arguing for the assistance prong);
Harding, supra note I4, at 135-37 (arguing for the assistance prong).
I42 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 n.3 (I986) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating, "I
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courts have relied upon Justice Powell's opinion in finding that the Eighth
Amendment does not require an assistance prong, some have argued that
analysis should be reconsidered.'43
While the state statutes that define competency do contain requirements
that defendants be aware of the nature of the punishment, they do not
define those awareness requirements. Thus, the statutes provide little
guidance on the issue of whether there exists a widespread requirement
that a defendant have an understanding of death. 144 For example, many
statutes are similar to the federal statute, which states: "A sentence of death
shall not be carried out upon a person who, as a result of mental disability,
lacks the mental capacity to understand the death penalty and why it was
imposed on that person."' 145 An unaddressed issue, however, is whether
or not one "understands the death penalty" if one does not understand
death.
B. Lower Court Decisions Regarding Death Comprehension
Lower court decisions have not provided much guidance for determining
execution competency beyond the Supreme Court's vague formulations in
Fordv. Wainwright'and Panettiv. Quarterman. As one commentator has noted,
instead of lower courts embracing the opportunity to experiment with state
standards that might be more precise and protective of defendants' rights
under state law and state constitutions, courts have generally focused on
interpreting Justice Powell's language from Ford narrowly. 46
The issue of whether a mentally ill defendant needs to be able to
comprehend death to be competent is just beginning to be considered by
lower courts. In Walton v. Johnson, 47 the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals
find no sound basis for constitutionalizing the broader definition of insanity, with its require-
ment that the defendant be able to assist in his own defense"). But c. Singleton, 437 S.E.zd
at 56-58 (providing significant historical support for the proposition that assistance is consti-
tutionally mandated). As discussed earlier though, the requirement of an assistance prong is
consistent with one of the justifications for the ban on executing incompetent inmates be-
cause one historical justification for the ban was that insane defendants could not assist their
attorneys. See supra pp. 270-72.
143 See, e.g., Seeds, supra note 48, at 332-39; cf. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949
(2007) (noting that Justice Powell's opinion in Ford "constitutes 'clearly established' law for
purposes of [habeas corpus claims] and sets the minimum procedures a State must provide to
a prisoner raising a Ford-based competency claim").
144 Cf. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, To Panetti and Beyond-Defining and Identifying Capital
Offenders Who are Too "Insane" to be Executed, 34 Am. J. CRIM. L. 369,430-31 (2007) (containing
appendix of state statutes and court decisions pertaining to the ban on executing insane or
incompetent offenders).
145 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2oo6).
146 Developments in the Law-The Law of Mental Illness, 12 1 HA v. L. REv. I156, 1162-63
(2oo8).
147 Walton v. Johnson, 44o E3d 16o (4th Cir. 2oo6).
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for the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of death comprehension in the
context of the competency to be executed standard.'48 The court found
the condemned competent to be executed, but the divided court in a 7-
6 decision raised questions about the correct standard for determining
competency to be executed. 49
In the aforementioned case, Percy Walton pleaded guilty to murdering
three people in two separate incidents and was sentenced to death in
Virginia state court. 50 Prior to the pleas, Walton was evaluated by two
psychiatrists who found that he understood the nature of the legal
proceedings and that he was competent. 5 ' One of the psychiatrists did
note that Walton exhibited strange behavior at that time, and Walton was
reported to have stated that after his execution "he would be able to return
to life immediately and resurrect other dead family members."'"I
Years later, during Walton's federal habeas corpus proceedings, Walton's
attorneys argued that Walton was incompetent to be executed. 5 3 At a
district court hearing, two defense experts claimed that Walton suffers
"from schizophrenia and has borderline delusional ideas about his ability
to come back to life after his execution."' 5 4 The state's expert disagreed. 5
The district court denied habeas relief and concluded, "Walton both
understands that he is to be executed and that his execution is punishment
for his conviction for murder."' 15 6
The en banc court of appeals upheld the district court finding of
competency, stating that the correct test from Justice Powell's Ford opinion
is that "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who
are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are
to suffer it."'5 7 The court stressed that this two-part test-of (1) awareness
of the punishment and (2) the reasons for the punishment-is followed in
all four federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue and in a federal
148 Id. at 170-73.
149 Id. at 178, 183.
150 Id. at 162; see, e.g., Walton v. Angelone, 32 1 E3d 442,449-50 (4th Cir. 2003).
151 Walton v. Johnson, 440 F3d at 163.
152 Walton v. Angelone, 3z1 E3d at 454.
153 Walton v. Johnson, 44o F3d at 163-64. They also argued that he was "mentally re-
tarded." Id. at 163.
154 Id. at 164. Among other statements, Walton told one doctor that after his execution
"he would 'come back as a better person' and would 'get a Burger King."' Id. (citation omit-
ted).
155 Id. at 166. A neutral expert also found Walton competent, although he concluded
that Walton's answers about death were "childlike" and that Walton is not "a person who is
going to prepare for his death." Id. at 166-67.
156 Id. at 168 (quoting Walton v. Johnson, 306 F. Supp. 2d 597, 598 (W.D. Va. 2004)).
157 Id. at 170 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
ring)).
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statute.' s The court rejected the argument that there is any requirement"that an inmate must be able to assist in his defense throughout the
competency determination process."159
The court also rejected the argument that an inmate must also
understand that to be executed means one's "physical life" will end. I60
The court reasoned that one must only understand that one will die by
execution, and that the district court had made such a finding and that
finding was not "plainly wrong." 161
Chief Judge Wilkins, in a dissent joined by five other judges, disagreed
with the majority's formulation of the standard. He argued "that an
individual's understanding of the fact of execution [the first prong] must
include at least a rudimentary comprehension that execution will mean
his death, defined as the end of his physical life." 61 Chief Judge Wilkins
reasoned that the Ford inquiry required that the condemned understand
what "to die" means. 63
Chief Judge Wilkins considered that Justice Powell in Fordemphasized
the retributive goal of the death penalty and that this goal is only
accomplished if a defendant realizes that she or he is facing the end of
physical life. 64 He also quoted language from other federal and state court
opinions that required an understanding of the nature of the death penalty
and required awareness that the punishment for murder is death. 16
Chief Judge Wilkins stressed that his standard did not implicate one's
religious beliefs, but merely required that the condemned understand that
the execution will mean an end to the physical life that one is currently
158 Id. at 171 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2oo6)).
159 Id. at 172. But see Christine I. Betzing, Walton v. Johnson: Failing to Recognize the
Importance of an Assistance Requirement to Adequately Protect Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row,
66 MD. L. REV. 1304, 1322-27 (2oo7) (arguing that the court in Walton should have required an
assistance prong to determine competency).
i6o Walton v. Johnson, 44o F3d at 175.
I61 Id. at 175-76 (quoting Jimenez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F3d 369, 379 (4th
Cir. 1995)). Although the majority rejected the dissent's test, it concluded that even if it were
to apply the dissent's test, the record revealed that Walton did understand that his execution
would mean the end of his physical life. Id. at 175 n.17.
162 Id. at 183 (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting).
163 Id. (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 184 (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422
(1986) (Powell, J., concurring)).
165 Id. at 184-85 (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., Scott v. Mitchell, 250 F3 d 1Ol 1, 1014
(6th Cir. zooi) (quoting OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.28(A) (LexisNexis 2002) (requiring "the
mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty")); Barnard v. Collins, 13 E3d
871, 876-77 (5th Cir. 1994) (referring to standard that a condemned "comprehends the nature.
.. of his execution") (footnote omitted); Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, I36 F Supp. 2d I014, 1o8 (D.
Ariz. 2001) (requiring awareness that the punishment for murder is death); State v. Scott, 748
N.E.zd 11, 13 (Ohio 2001) (quoting OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.28(A) (LexisNexis 2oo2)).
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living. 166 Applying that standard, he reasoned that there was evidence the
district court should consider in determining whether Walton merely viewed
death as "a brief interruption of his current physical life."16' Therefore, he
concluded that the court should remand the case to the district court. 16
In a detailed concurring opinion, Judge Williams attacked the dissent's
test.' 69 Judge Williams reasoned that Justice Powell's test from Ford does
not require that the condemned understand that execution is the end of
physical life. 70 He noted that the Ford test only requires awareness of the
punishment and the reasons for the punishment.' 7 1 Further, he criticized
the dissent's death comprehension test on practical grounds because it
"both (1) fails to account for the fact that many understand death on non-
scientific terms and (2) requires courts to evaluate the meaning of such
non-scientific understandings." ' As an example, Judge Williams asked
about a Solipsist who believes "that all things, including his own body, are
merely illusions." 173  He asked whether such a person would be insane
under the dissent's test. 74 Thus, Judge Williams agreed with the majority
in rejecting the death comprehension test.
Soon after the court of appeals decision in Percy Walton's case, Walton's
execution was set for June 2006.175 Although the courts did not find
Walton incompetent to be executed, Virginia Governor Timothy M. Kaine
considered more recent evidence that Walton's mental state was such that"there was more than a minimal chance that Walton no longer knew why
he was to be executed or was even aware of the final punishment he was
about to receive." 176 After initially staying Walton's execution for eighteen
months "[blecause one could not reasonably conclude that Walton was fully
166 Walton v. Johnson, 44o E3d at 187 (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting).
167 Id. (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 191 (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Wilkins also argued that the case
should be remanded based on Walton's mental retardation claim. Id. at 191 n.5 (Wilkins, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002)).
169 There were two concurring opinions in the case. In one of them, Judge Wilkinson
concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not require "metaphysical inquiries" into wheth-
er a defendant understands the end of life. Id. at 179 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
170 Id. at 179-80 (Williams, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 18o (Williams, J., concurring) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 390, 422
(1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989)).
172 Walton v. Johnson, 44o F 3 d at 18o (Williams, J., concurring).
173 Id. (Williams, J., concurring).
174 Id. (Williams, J., concurring). The answer is that such a person would not be insane
under the dissent's test because it requires that the lack of awareness to be caused by mental
disease or illness.
175 Tom Jackman, Mental State Still at Issue in Va. Death Penalty Case, WAsH. POST, June
10, 2006, at Boi.
176 Press Release, Gov. Timothy M. Kaine, Statement of Governor Kaine on the
Scheduled Execution of Percy Levar Walton (June 9, 2oo8), http://www.governor.virginia.gov/
MediaRelations/NewsReleases/viewRelease.cfm?id=68o.
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aware of the punishment he was about to suffer and why he was to suffer it,"
Governor Kaine commuted Percy Walton's sentence to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole on June 9, 2008.177
Although the outcome of Percy Walton's case has been resolved,
the question of whether death comprehension is required to establish
competency to be executed is still unsettled. The issue has not been
addressed often, but similar to Walton, some other courts have implied that
a defendant need not have an understanding that they were going to die in
order to be competent. 7 Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit based its decision to vacate a defendant's stay in Garettv. Collins79
on several alternative grounds, the court also found that the defendant's
belief that his aunt would protect him from dying would not make him
incompetent to be executed."8
On the other hand, some courts have implied that the competency
standard should require an understanding of death. 8 ' One study of 280
177 Id. Governor Kaine described Walton's current state in 2oo8 as follows:
Walton differs in fundamental ways from other death row offenders. He
lives in a self-imposed state of isolation that includes virtually no inter-
est in receiving or understanding information. Walton communicates
only infrequently, almost invariably in response to direct questions, and
those responses are minimal in nature. He has nothing in his cell other
than a mattress, a pillow and a blanket. He shows no interest in contact
with the outside world and has no television, radio, magazines, books or
stationery. He has no personal effects of any kind. This minimal exis-
tence has been in evidence for the past five years.
Id. In considering other factors that were less relevant to the grant of clemency, Governor
Kaine noted that Walton committed the murders less than two months after turning eighteen
and that there were indications of his mental retardation. Id.
178 See, e.g., Garrett v. Collins, 951 F.d 57, 58-59 (5th Cir. 1992).
179 Id. at 59.
i8o Id. The court reasoned that even if the defendant had such a belief, it would "not
prevent him from preparing for his passing." Id. In Garrt, however, the defendant's attorney
argued only that the defendant believed he would be rescued, not that he did not understand
death. Id. at 58. Arguably, then, the case does not address the comprehension of death issue
at all.
18i See Musselwhite v. State, 6o So. ad 807, 809 (Miss. 1952) (noting that the defendant
was incompetent to be executed where "if he were taken to the electric chair, he would not
quail or take account of its significance"); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58 (S.C. 1993)
(holding that the first prong of the test includes the question of whether the defendant under-
stands "the nature of the punishment"); State v. Harris, 789 P.ad 60, 65 (Wash. 1990) (focusing
on the ability to assist prong of the incompetence test but noting that the other prong requires
that condemned be "capable of properly appreciating his peril").
At least some of the other parts of the standard developed in Singleton were not based
upon the U.S. Constitution. Singleton, 437 S.E.ad at 58. Also, the judges in Walton v, Johnson
debated whether the language in Singleton and Musselwhite actually addressed the issue of
death comprehension. SeeWalton v. Johnson, 44o E3d 16o, 185-86 (4th Cir. aoo6) (Williams, J.,
concurring) (citing Singleton, 437 S.E.ad at 58; Mussewhite, 6o So.ad at 809); Thompson v. Bell,
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state judges, all from death penalty states, asked the judges to rate various
factors and whether those factors affect determinations of competency."' 2
The judges rated the factor "[t]he inmate understands that death is an end
of life as we know it (i.e., a permanent cessation of all vital functions)" 18 3 as a
moderately important factor among seventeen factors."' This inconsistency
leaves to be resolved whether an offender must comprehend death in order
to be considered competent to be executed.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES A DEATH COMPREHENSION STANDARD
In considering the proper standard for the insanity execution ban, one
needs to begin with the policies behind the death penalty and behind the
ban itself. As discussed below, the policies behind the insanity execution
ban have questionable merit. But despite those questions, the ban and
the rationales behind it have a long, historical pedigree. Accepting those
rationales, they overwhelmingly support a death comprehension standard
that only finds competency if a mentally-ill defendant is able to comprehend
the meaning of death. Therefore, if due to mental illness a defendant does
not comprehend that the execution will mean the end of the condemned's
physical life, that person should be found incompetent to be executed.
A. Critique of the Rationale for the Ban on Executing the Insane
Before turning to the legal standard, it is worth noting that the rationale
for not executing the insane rests on shaky reasoning." 5 As discussed
above, several reasons are often listed to justify the ban, but there seems to
be no agreement on one solid justification.
For example, the deterrent justification for the ban may be questioned.
One might argue that executing the insane, just like executing anyone,
may serve a general deterrent purpose by deterring others from committing
murder."6 Assuming the death penalty has any deterrent value, just because
an execution of an insane person does not deter other insane persons does
580 F3 d 4 23,4 3 6 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that for a determination of execution competency, it
is significant that the defendant believed that execution would not "eliminate his life").
182 See Ackerson et al., supra note 5, at 172-73.
183 Id. app. A, at 19o.
184 td. at 17 4 tbl.I.
185 See Jonathan L. Entin, Psychiatry, Insanity, andthe Death Penaly: A Note on Implementing
Supreme Court Decisions, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 2 18, 233-37 (1988) (discussing problems
with the various rationales for the ban on executing the insane). Professor Entin concluded
that the reason the ban persists, despite a lack of rational justification, is because it has "sym-
bolic significance" in reducing the class of the condemned who are subject to execution. Id.
at 239.
186 Id. at 234-35.
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not mean it would not deter anyone;"8 7 sane persons would be deterred by
executions of both sane and insane persons. 18
One might also attack the retribution justification for the ban. The
retribution justification focuses on the requirement that the condemned
appreciate that she or he is being punished. But not all retributive theorists
agree.189 Based upon some views of retribution principles, one deserves
punishment whether or not the person understands it. A retributivist view
that focuses on society's obligation to impose a deserved punishment would
support the view that the retribution justification is served whether or not
the defendant appreciates the punishment. 19° Thus, such a retributivist
theory would not support banning the execution of the insane.
A retributivist view that retribution is only served if a defendant
appreciates the punishment does support a ban on executing the insane.11
But even a justification based on a retributivist view that focuses on a
187 It is questionable whether the death penalty has any more deterrent effect than a
sentence of life in prison. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615 (2002) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (stating that "[situdies of deterrence are, at most, inconclusive"); John J. Donohue
& Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 791, 794 (2005) (evaluating studies claiming that the death penalty deters more than life
imprisonment and concluding there is "profound uncertainty" whether the death penalty has
any deterrent effect); Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty:
The Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I, 8 (1996) (finding consensus among
criminologists that research does not show that the death penalty deters). But cf. Hashem
Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent
Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 344, 344 (2003)
(finding that "capital punishment has a strong deterrent effect; each execution results, on
average, in eighteen or fewer murders-with a margin of error of plus or minus ten").
I88 See, e.g., Koepke, supra note 9, at 1401.
189 There are different strains of retribution theory-including societal retaliation (also
described as assaultive retribution or public vengeance), protective retribution, and victim
vindication. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 17-18 (4th ed. 2006) (cita-
tions omitted). Views of retribution that focus upon society's obligation to punish the criminal,
whether because society wants to hurt wrongdoers or "as a means of securing a moral balance
in society," do not require that the offender understand the punishment. See id. at 18.
19o For example, Immanuel Kant noted the requirement that civil society must execute
murderers "so that everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the
blood-guilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying
out the punishment." See MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND
LITERATURE 16o (1990) (quoting IMMANUAL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE
iO2 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797)).
19i See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007) (noting that capital punishment
"has the potential to make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime"). The Court
in Panetti went on to state:
The potential for a prisoner's recognition of the severity of the offense
and the objective of community vindication are called in question...
if the prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his
awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the
understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole.
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defendant's appreciation of the punishment has faults. A retributivist view
that requires the individual's appreciation of the punishment could lead to
an argument that an incompetent defendant who does not appreciate the
punishment should not be punished at all. 19
The procedural justification, which is based on the fact that the insane
are unable to assist their counsel, also provides some support for the ban on
executing the insane. Yet, some argue that this justification is less relevant
to the modern legal system where the time of execution is far from the time
of trial and other competency standards, such as competency to stand trial,
help address this concern.' 93
The humanitarian justification for banning the execution of the insane
also rests on shaky ground. After the Supreme Court agreed to hear Fordv.
Wainwright, John Horwood, a Washington correspondent for the St. Petersburg
Times, wrote: "I must confess to some reservations about the idea that it is
especially cruel to execute the insane. Perhaps I'm savage and inhuman[],
but it seems to me to be, if anything, somewhat less cruel than electrocuting
a sane man who can grasp the horror of his fate."'94 Judge Roger Traynor of
the California Supreme Court once questioned the rationale in asking, "Is
it not an inverted humanitarianism that deplores as barbarous the capital
punishment of those who have become insane after trial and conviction, but
accepts the capital punishment of sane men, a curious reasoning that would
free a man from capital punishment only if he is not in full possession of his
senses?"'195
One of the other arguments for the ban-that a condemned person
needs to be sane to prepare for death and to meet one's Maker-is another
odd justification. One might argue that, as part of retribution, society
should not care about the condemned's eternal soul, assuming one exists,
or that the Maker might be forgiving of one who cannot prepare for death.
Either way, it is odd to base a penological justification upon whether or
not a Maker exists and to speculate how such Maker would treat the dead,
insane person.
Thus, the justifications for banning the execution of the insane provide
a shaky foundation for the ban. The reason for a lack of a single solid
justification may be because the absurdity of the ban on executing the insane
Id. at 958-59.
192 See Entin, supra note 185, at 236.
193 As noted earlier in Part Ill.A., there are several arguments for the Court to reconsider
the importance of an assistance prong to a constitutional standard for determining competen-
cy to be executed. See supra pp. 283-85; see also Christopher Seeds, supra note 48, at 337-48.
194 MILLER & RADELET, supra note 12, at 138 (quoting John Horwood, Opposing the Death
Penalty, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 20, 1986, at 4D).
195 Phyle v. Duffy, 2o8 P.2d 668, 676-77 (Cal. 1949) (Traynor, J., concurring), overuledin
part by Caritativo v. Teets, 303 P.ad 339,341 (Cal. 1956).
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is a reflection of absurd aspects of the death penalty itself. 96 Discussions
of the best way to kill human beings contrast with the invocation of human
decency for guidance.
Overall, the retribution justification is the strongest justification for the
ban on executing the insane. There are various theories of retribution, and
one might reasonably argue that retribution is only served if the offender
can appreciate the punishment. Acceptance of this justification, however,
means that society desires that executions maintain a certain level of cruelty
to serve the purposes of the death penalty. 97
The procedural protection justification for the ban on executing the
insane also has some merit. Although it is true that today our legal system
provides other competency determinations that protect the procedural
rights of incompetent defendants at some legal stages-such as competency
to stand trial-the ban on executing the insane can still provide procedural
protections to defendants who are further along in the legal process, such
as in post-conviction or clemency proceedings. 191
Despite criticisms of the justifications for the ban, it is here to stay as
both a practical matter and as a constitutional matter as long as the death
penalty is used. The ban has existed too long historically for courts and
legislatures to change it.199 Therefore, courts must struggle with coming up
with a standard that best serves the justifications that underlie the ban.
B. Fashioning an Execution Competency Standardfrom the Court's Reasoningfor
the Ban on Executing the Insane
The Eighth Amendment ban on executing the insane is based on
196 See, e.g., Hazard & Louisell, supra note 28, at 389 (noting, "[i]t seems evident that
the uneasiness manifested in applying the insanity exemption is uneasiness over the death
penalty").
197 Some commentators have argued, however, that retribution should not play a sig-
nificant role in criminal law. Roscoe Pound argued, "[I1n order to deal with crime in an
intelligent and practical manner we must give up the retributive theory." Roscoe Pound,
Criminal Justice in the American City-A Summary, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS
OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CLEVELAND, OHIO 559, 586-87 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922); see also Jeffrey
L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors andthe Progression Towarda Disease
Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 722-26 (2004) (arguing that the criminal justice
system should focus on policies other than retribution).
198 See Seeds, supra note 48, at 344 (stating, "[i]f a prisoner is incompetent during collat-
eral review, the proceedings cannot assuredly root out trial error, nor can they reliably uncover
issues of innocence that would found an application for executive clemency").
199 See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), abro-
gatedby Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986). Justice Frankfurter argued, "We should
not be less humane than were Englishmen in the centuries that preceded this Republic." Id.
at 19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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policy concerns different from other issues of legal competency, °°  so the
standard for execution competency must be well-grounded in the unique
policy reasons behind the ban. The Supreme Court in Panetiv. Quarterman
stressed that the execution competency standard should be connected to
the purposes of the punishment, stating that the standard must not put
the defendant's awareness "in a context so far removed from reality that
the punishment can serve no proper purpose."2 0' Thus, one must look to
the purposes of the punishment in crafting the constitutional standard for
determining competency to be executed.
As discussed earlier, there are five general rationales that have been used
to justify the ban on executing the insane. 02 The main reasons used for our
current constitutional ban on executing the insane are: (1) executing the
insane does not serve the punishment goal of deterrence; 03 (2) executing
the insane does not serve the punishment goal of retribution;20° (3) insane
persons are unable to adequately assist in their legal defense, so the ban
ensures a fair and accurate process;"0 ' (4) executing the insane "offends
humanity; °20 6 and (5) a person who is insane cannot prepare for death and
the afterlife.0 7 As discussed earlier, the retribution rationale is the strongest
justification for the ban.
All of the justifications for the ban support a death comprehension
insanity standard that requires a defendant to be aware that her or his
physical life is ending. This standard is consistent with the one proposed by
Chief Judge Wilkins in Walton v. Johnson.10 8 It also reflects the formulation
proposed by Justice Frankfurter in 1950 in Solesbee v. Balkcom requiring
that a defendant understand "the impending fate which awaits him.''2°9
First, the goal of deterrence is not served by the execution of one without
death comprehension. If the purpose of using the severe punishment of
death is to give extra deterrence to the punishment, people without an
understanding of death will not be deterred. On the other hand, if a state
2oo For example, the Supreme Court stressed in Iowa v. Tovar that a defendant who
waives counsel need not completely appreciate the consequences resulting from such waiver;
however, that case involved different policy concerns regarding the Sixth Amendment than
the punishment principles surrounding the Eighth Amendment ban on executing the insane.
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004).
201 Pantetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007).
202 See supra pp. 268-72.
203 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 419 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting COKE,
supra note 34, at 6).
204 Id. at 408 (plurality opinion) (citing Hazard & Louisell, supra note 28, at 387).
205 Id. at 406-07 (plurality opinion) (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *z4-25).
zo6 Id. at 407 (plurality opinion) (citing COKE, supra note 17, at 6).
207 Id. at 419-20 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Hawles, supra note ii, at 477).
2o8 Walton v. Johnson, 440 F3d i6o, 184-85 (4th Cir. 2oo6) (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting).
209 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 2o n.3 (195o) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting In
re Smith, 176 P. 819, 823 (N.M. 1918)), abrogated by Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
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executes one without death comprehension, it would still deter other
people who are not insane. But, even accepting the questionable premise
that the death penalty deters murder, 10 such deterrence of potential sane
offenders would be at most minimal beyond any existing deterrence from
executing sane condemned inmates.
Second, the goal of retribution is not fully served by executing one
who does not understand death. As discussed earlier, the retribution
justification for the ban on executing the insane is based on the rationale
that the death penalty does not make the insane suffer enough to serve the
goal of retribution."' For example, if because of a mental illness one did
not understand she or he were going to be executed, then the condemned
would not suffer as much as a sane person and therefore the goal of
retribution would not be served. The retribution justification reasons that
only the sane suffer enough because, to quote Abraham Lincoln, they
can "live in constant dread of [death]" and therefore "die over and over
again." ' Similarly, if because of a mental illness one believed that her or
his physical life will not end when executed, that person cannot appreciate
the punishment enough to serve the goal of retribution. 13
Under the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis, it is significant that
the retribution rationale strongly supports a standard requiring that the
defendant understands that execution will result in the end of her or his
life. In Panetti, the Supreme Court relied upon the retribution rationale in
evaluating the competency standard to be applied in that case. 1 4 Thus, the
Supreme Court's consideration of the death comprehension issue would
210 See, e.g., Matthew B. Robinson, The Real Death Penalty: Capital Punishment According
to the Experts, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (2009) (concluding that "only a small fraction of death
penalty experts ... indicated that they thought capital punishment achieves deterrence");
Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: D& Vu All Over Again?, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 328 (2005); Donohue &Wolfers, supra note 187, at 792-94.
211 See supra p. 269.
212 2 JOHN T. MORSE, JR., ABRAHAM LINCOLN 345 (Cambridge, Mass., The Riverside
Press 1893). Lincoln stated, "If I am killed, I can die but once; but to live in constant dread of
it, is to die over and over again." Id.
213 See Musselwhite v. State, 6o So. 2d 807, 809 (Miss. 1952) (noting that the defendant
was incompetent to be executed where "if he were taken to the electric chair, he would not
quail or take account of its significance").
214 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 , 958 (2007). Considering retribution, the Court
stated:
[I]t might be said that capital punishment is imposed because it has the
potential to make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime
and to allow the community as a whole, including the surviving family
and friends of the victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability
of the prisoner is so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought
and imposed.
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likely hinge on the retribution policy."'5
Regarding the policy for the ban that an insane person is unable to
adequately assist in her or his legal defense, this justification is less relevant
to the execution competency standard under the Eighth Amendment
because the Supreme Court has arguably rejected a constitutional standard
that requires a defendant to be able to assist counsel. 16 Although Justice
Powell's Ford concurring opinion did not adopt an assistance prong to the
competency test,1 7 Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Ford included
a quotation from Blackstone that listed this justification for the ban.2 1 8 At
least one commentator has argued that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
in Panetti revived the significance of Justice Marshall's Ford opinion,
meaning that the assistance justification for the ban on executing the
insane should be reconsidered. 19 Assuming the assistance justification still
has some constitutional foundation, it, too, would support a standard that
requires a prisoner to know that an execution will end physical life. A
condemned prisoner who believes that the execution will not result in the
end of life may not have adequate motivation or comprehension to fully
assist counsel.
The fourth justification, that the execution of the insane offends
humanity, also applies to situations where the condemned does not know
that execution will terminate physical life. Although the question of
whether humanity is offended is a somewhat subjective determination, if
courts believe that humanity is offended by the execution of the insane,
it is reasonable to believe that the group of "insane" would include those
with mental illness who are unable to comprehend death.2 0
Finally, the last reason for the ban on execution of the insane is that
the condemned should be able to prepare for death and the afterlife. If
one does not recognize that execution will bring about the end of physical
life, that person cannot prepare for death or the afterlife. Therefore, this
justification also supports a death comprehension standard.
If mental incompetency is dictating one's beliefs, that person cannot
215 Throughout the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has often re-
lied upon the retribution justification for the death penalty. See Kirchmeier, supra note 197, at
641-42; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (addressing the constitutionality of
capital punishment and noting that retribution justification could justify the use of the death
penalty).
216 See Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53,56 (S.C. 1993).
217 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 n.3 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating, "I
find no sound basis for constitutionalizing the broader definition of insanity, with its require-
ment that the defendant be able to assist in his own defense").
218 Id. at 406-07 (plurality opinion) (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *24-z5).
2 19 See Seeds, supra note 48, at 332-39.
22o A counterargument, however, is that it would be more humane to execute someone
who cannot comprehend the terror of death. See supra notes 194 and 196 and accompanying
text.
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adequately prepare for his or her death. If there actually is an afterlife, it
is cruel to prevent one from preparing for it by killing the person when she
or he is insane. Of course, if there is no afterlife, then it does not matter.
But we do not know whether or not there is an afterlife, so what matters is
our perception of the possibilities. If we take an existentialist perspective
and recognize that we do not really know what happens after death and
that each individual creates her or his own belief system,"'1 it is unjust to
execute one who is insane and incapable of preparing for death.
On the other hand, one argument against a standard that requires one to
comprehend death would be that the law should not get into questioning
one's beliefs about the afterlife. It is difficult to argue that Percy Walton's
belief that he will come back to life after execution shows he is incompetent
while a Christian's belief that she or he will go to heaven is different. I
once worked on a case where a mentally ill capital defendant believed
that after his execution he would go to another planet and live with the
girlfriend he had murdered, that she would be an elf, and that together they
would rule the planet.2 2 It sounds insane because nobody else believes
that, but should the standard be that one is insane if they create a unique
belief, while one is sane if the person believes the same belief as millions
of others?
Still, there is a difference. In discussing the standards to determine
incompetency, courts all begin with the premise that these beliefs originate
with the prisoner's mental illness."2 3 The proposed standard does not ban
the execution of someone who follows a certain religion or has a certain
faith. It bans the execution of someone who does not recognize the concept
of death because of mental disease, mental illness, or lack of mental capacity
to comprehend death.2 4
Also, as Chief Judge Wilkins pointed out in Walton, the requirement "is
not about anyone's religious or philosophical views about the afterlife or
221 See e.g., JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM (Bernard Frechtman trans., 1947), re-
printed in BASIC WRITINGS OF EXISTENTIALISM, at 345 (Gordon Marino ed., 2004) (explaining
that "existence precedes essence," meaning that "man exists, turns up, appears on the scene,
and only afterwards, defines himself"). See ERNEST BECKER, ThE DENIAL OF DEATH 13-15, 27
(1973) (discussing the impacts of humans' knowledge of their mortality).
222 See Brewer v. Lewis, 997 Ezd 550 , 554 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that the condemned believed that after his execution he would rejoin his murdered
girlfriend, who had been the incarnation of the deity man-elf, "Fro," on the planet "Terracia"
after his execution).
223 For example, Justice Powell's standard from Ford requires that to be found
incompetent to be executed, one must "not have the mental capacity to understand the nature
of the death penalty" and the reason the punishment was imposed upon the person. Ford, 477
U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West zooI)).
224 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,959-60 (2007).
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absence thereof."I 5 The condemned must merely understand that it is the
end of the physical life he or she is currently living.2 16
CONCLUSION
[Tihe dread of something after death,
The undiscovered country from whose bourn.
No traveller returns, puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of?
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all ....
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE27
If due to a mental defect or mental illness, a condemned inmate cannot
appreciate that the walk to the execution gurney or death chamber will
mean the end of physical life, that person should not be executed. Under
the historical policies behind the ban on executing the insane and more
recent Supreme Court precedent, the U.S. Constitution demands a death
comprehension standard for competency to be executed.2 8
The justifications for the common law and Eighth Amendment ban
on executing the insane require a test that finds a condemned person
incompetent if the person does not understand death. Otherwise, the
penological goals of the death penalty are not served. Those who do not
comprehend death are not as a category a group of people who will be
deterred by the death penalty more than life in prison, and such persons will
not be able to appreciate the moral condemnation designed to be delivered
by the death penalty. Additionally, they will not be able to prepare for
death. Thus, the Supreme Court should hold that a capital defendant is
incompetent to be executed when, because of a mental disease or defect,
the person does not understand that she or he is going to die. In other
words, to be competent, the condemned must realize she or he is facing the
end of physical life as she or he knows it.
Finally, outside of the courts' application of the standard required under
historical and constitutional precedent, legislatures should clarify their
standards for execution competence. In doing so, they should recognize
that they may give broader protections than the Eighth Amendment and
consider the policies for the insanity ban that support a death comprehension
standard, as discussed throughout this Article.
225 Walton v. Johnson, 44o E3d 16o, 187 (4th Cir. zoo6) (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting).
226 Id. (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting).
227 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. I.
228 Ser supra pp. 293-98.
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Legislatures should consider another underlying justification for the
ban on executing the insane that was briefly referenced by Justice Marshall
in Ford v. Wainright.2 9 Perhaps the real reason society frowns upon the
execution of the insane has less to do with the person condemned and
more to do with the condemners. Despite the efforts to fashion rational
reasons for the ban, the ban on executing the insane may come down to one
concept: humans are repulsed by the idea of killing the insane. 30 Humans
do not wish to believe they are cruel, and there is something cruel about
killing people who cannot appreciate the reasons why they are being killed
-or even appreciate that they are being killed.2 3'
If the reason for the ban is our own repulsion of executing someone
who is insane, then whether or not a state adopts a death comprehension
standard for competency may hinge on something besides deterrence and
retribution. The answer may depend upon our own moral judgment about
whether it is cruel to execute one who, due to a mental disease or defect,
cannot appreciate that life is ending. Until the Supreme Court resolves
the issue, each state is left to consider whether it is cruel to kill someone
who cannot competently consider the question of what it means "not to
be." '32 And so the resolution of the issue may ultimately depend less on
the question of who we are killing and more on the question of who we
are.
229 He noted that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane
"[w]hether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of un-
derstanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless
vengeance." Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
230 See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 29, at 112-13 (discussing international norms against
executing the insane).
231 Such a rationale is related to one of the common-law justifications for the insan-
ity defense in that insanity is punishment by itself. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 407-08 (citing 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note i8, at *395-96).
Just as some people are more upset about the killing of the insane than the killing of the
sane, many people are more upset to read about a dog being killed than reading about a sane
murderer being executed. Compare Eric S. Page, Dog Dies 'Hornific' Death, NBC SAN DIEGO
NEWS, April 1, 2009, http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Dog-Dies-Horrific-Death.html
(noting local residents "are outraged about what happened to a dog after it was hit by a car"),
with World: Americas Cheers and Prayers Greet Tucker's Death, BBC NEWS, Feb. 4, 1998, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/i/hi/world/americas/53295.stm (noting that once it appeared that the execu-
tion of Karla Faye Tucker would take place "a large cheer went up from those who had wanted
Tucker to pay for her crimes").
232 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. I
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